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What can we learn about immediate memory from the
development of children’s free recall?
Christopher Jarrold1, Debbora Hall1, Caroline E. Harvey1, Helen Tam1,
John N. Towse2, and Amy L. Zarandi1
1School of Experimental Psychology, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
2Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
(Received 28 May 2014; accepted 27 November 2014; ﬁrst published online 16 February 2015)
We ask the question: Which aspects of immediate memory performance improve with age? In two
studies, we reexamine the widely held view that primary memory capacity estimates derived from chil-
dren’s immediate free recall are age invariant. This was done by assessing children’s immediate free-
recall accuracy while also measuring the order in which they elected to recall items (Experiment 1)
and by encouraging children to begin free recall with items from towards the end of the presented
list (Experiment 2). Across samples aged between 5 and 8 years we replicated the previously reported
age-related changes in free-recall serial position functions when aggregated across all trials of the stan-
dard task, including an absence of age differences in the recency portion of this curve. However, we also
show that this does not reﬂect the fact that primary memory capacity is constant across age. Instead,
when we incorporate order of report information, clear age differences are evident in the recall of
list-ﬁnal items that are output at the start of a participant’s response. In addition, the total amount
that individuals recalled varied little across different types of free-recall tasks. These ﬁndings have
clear implications for the use of immediate free recall as a means of providing potential indices of
primary memory capacity and in the study of the development of immediate memory.
Keywords: Primary memory; Free recall; Immediate memory development.
The study of immediate memory has an extensive
history in experimental psychology. For example,
James (1890) drew a distinction between “primary”
and “secondary” memory, with the former referring
to the subset of information that is currently avail-
able to conscious access and that can be immediately
recalled as a result, and the latter being information
that must be retrieved from “memory proper”.
Subsequent authors subsumed this distinction into
models of short-term and working memory (e.g.,
Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Baddeley & Hitch,
1974), and one can certainly draw a parallel
between the notion of primary memory and the
concept of short-term memory as assessed by
measures of immediate serial recall or so-called
“simple span” tasks. Indeed, current models of
short-term memory often assume that the capacity
of this system is determined by the number of
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items that one can keep active within some “focus of
attention” or “region of direct access” (Cowan, 2001;
Cowan et al., 2005; Oberauer, 2002), thereby
drawing a direct link between short-term memory
performance and the concept of primary memory
as deﬁned by James.
Having said this, the concepts of primary and sec-
ondary memory are not synonymous with short- and
long-term memory, respectively, because they are less
clearly tied to particular time-scales over which forget-
ting might occur. Rather, they are deﬁnitions that
focus more on different underlying processes—the
maintenance of information in a consciously accessi-
ble state in the case of primary memory, the retrieval
of information by effortful and strategic search in
the case of secondary memory—than on separable
cognitive structures. In line with this, primary
memory has recently become the focus of considerable
research attention in areas that go beyond the study of
immediate serial recall and the related concept of
short-term memory. This renaissance is largely due
to work by Unsworth et al. (e.g., Unsworth &
Engle, 2006, 2007a, 2007b), who have argued that
both primary and secondary memory underpin
working memory performance as measured using
“complex span” tasks that combine short-term
storage with potentially distracting processing activity
(see Conway et al., 2005). Performance on complex
span tasks is known to be a strong predictor of indi-
vidual differences on a range of cognitive traits,
including measures of intelligence and academic
attainment in both adults (e.g., Kane, Hambrick, &
Conway, 2005; Oberauer, Schulze, Wilhelm, &
Süß, 2005) and children (Bayliss, Jarrold, Gunn,
& Baddeley, 2003; De Smedt et al., 2009; Nevo &
Breznitz, 2011; Swanson, 2011). However,
Unsworth et al. have suggested that, rather than
reﬂecting the presence of a unitary underlying con-
struct of working memory, this predictive power of
complex span tasks is better understood in terms of
the independent contributions of primary and sec-
ondary memory capacity to task performance
(Unsworth, Spillers, & Brewer, 2010; see also
Mogle, Lovett, Stawski, & Sliwinski, 2008;
Shelton, Elliott, Matthews, Hill, & Gouvier, 2010).
In order to properly test this account without
falling foul of problems of circularity, one clearly
needs to derive estimates of primary and second-
ary memory capacity that are themselves indepen-
dent of complex span performance. One potential
means of extracting these estimates is to use a
free-recall task, in which the participant is pre-
sented with a list of words and is then asked to
recall as many of these words as they can in
any order they wish. Waugh and Norman
(1965) ﬁrst suggested that free recall depends
on both primary and secondary memory capacity.
They argued that, provided sufﬁcient items are
presented in an immediate free-recall task, sec-
ondary memory capacity can be estimated from
the level at which recall performance asymptotes
on the middle serial positions of the list; although
these items would have been held in primary
memory at the point of their presentation, they
would have been displaced to secondary memory
by the subsequent presentation of later items on
the list. In contrast they suggested that primary
memory capacity can be gauged from the
additional beneﬁt to recall seen on list-ﬁnal
items (the ﬁnal 7 list items in their analyses),
which they assumed would still be available to
conscious access. Tulving and Colotla (1970)
further developed this method of estimating
primary and secondary memory capacity on the
assumption that participants begin immediate
free recall by ﬁrst outputting the list-ﬁnal items
that are currently in primary memory, before
then performing a search of secondary memory
in an attempt to recall earlier list items (see also
Tulving, 1968). They therefore divided items
into those recalled from primary and secondary
memory using the intratrial retention interval
(ITRI)—that is, the number of other items that
were either presented or recalled between the
presentation and recall of the given item. They
argued that any item with an ITRI of 7 or less
should be classiﬁed as having been recalled from
primary memory.
It is important to note, however, that many
other theoretical accounts would argue against the
view that free recall depends on the functioning
of two distinct systems and would favour a more
unitary explanation of performance (Brown,
Neath, & Chater, 2007; Howard & Kahana,
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2002).1 Nevertheless, a number of recent studies
have employed free-recall tasks with the expressed
purpose of extracting primary memory estimates
from them (De Alwis, Myerson, Hershey, &
Hale, 2009; Gibson, Gondoli, Flies, Dobrzenski,
& Unsworth, 2009; Gibson et al., 2013;
Unsworth, Brewer, & Spillers, 2011; Unsworth
et al., 2010). Consequently, one focus of the
current paper was to ask whether the assumptions
underlying the simple partitioning of free-recall
performance into primary and secondary memory
components are valid, and, in particular, whether
free recall provides the direct index of primary
memory capacity in children that one would
assume given the recent interest in this possibility
in the adult literature (cf. Unsworth & Engle,
2007a).
Another reason for raising this question is that
the one recent study that has attempted to extract
primary and secondary memory capacity estimates
from children’s free recall came to what appear to
be surprising conclusions. De Alwis et al. (2009)
examined the development of primary and second-
ary memory in the context of free recall using the
Words List test of the Children’s Memory Scale
(Cohen, 1997). In this task, participants are pre-
sented with a 14-item word list that they have to
recall immediately, followed by further trials in
which learning is assessed by reminding individuals
of forgotten items. Recall of a novel distractor list
and delayed recall of the original list are also
assessed. This task was given to 57 children aged
between 6 and 16 years, who, as a group, showed
marked primacy and recency in their recall on the
1st trial of the target list and on the distractor list.
However, De Alwis et al. did not record the
order in which participants recalled list items and
so were unable to conduct an analysis along the
lines suggested by Tulving and Colotla (1970).
Instead, for the purposes of their analyses they
divided the presented list up into three subsections
that corresponded to the ﬁrst four, the middle six,
and the ﬁnal four items on the list, and they
assumed that the last four items on the list would
have been held in primary memory (cf. Moely,
1977). They then contrasted performance on
these ﬁnal items with recall of the initial subset,
which they assumed was held in secondary
memory. They found marked age effects on recall
of the initial list items, but not on recall of the
ﬁnal list items. As a result, they suggested that
“children’s secondary memory improves with age,
whereas their primary memory does not” (De
Alwis et al., 2009, p. 929).
Although striking, this claim is not unprece-
dented and has been advanced in at least two pre-
vious studies of children’s immediate free-recall
performance (Cole, Frankel, & Sharp, 1971;
Thurm & Glanzer, 1971; see Dempster &
Rohwer, 1983; Jablonski, 1974). However, it
remains a surprising one to make because there is
considerable reason to believe that children’s
primary memory does in fact develop substantially.
Given that primary memory is deﬁned as the subset
of information currently held active in mind
(Unsworth & Engle, 2007a; Waugh & Norman,
1965), then an individual’s ability to recall a just-
presented list in correct serial order should
provide a reasonable index of its capacity (see
Unsworth & Engle, 2007b). As already noted,
the concepts of primary memory and short-term
memory are arguably synonymous with one
another (Baddeley, 1986), and verbal span tasks,
in which participants simply have to repeat a just-
presented word or digit list, are accepted measures
of verbal short-term memory and clearly show sub-
stantial developmental improvements across early
and middle childhood (see Dempster, 1981;
Gathercole, 1999). Furthermore, recent studies
have shown a much greater commonality between
1Farrell (2012) has proposed an account of free recall that, potentially, provides something of a reconciliation of these views.
Although essentially a unitary account, based on the common hierarchical structuring of memory into discrete episodic clusters (see
General Discussion for a more thorough treatment), Farrell’s (2012) model assumes that individuals can recall just-presented infor-
mation from the currently open episodic cluster without the need to ﬁrst access it. This account therefore shares features with
models that assume that just-presented items have greater accessibility than all other material by virtue of being active in some
form of focus of attention (e.g., Cowan, 2001; Jonides et al., 2008; McElree, 2006; see also Nee & Jonides, 2011; Öztekin,
Davachi, & McElree, 2010).
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adults’ free-recall and serial-recall performance
than has previously been assumed (Bhatarah,
Ward, Smith, & Hayes, 2009; Grenfell-Essam &
Ward, 2012; Spurgeon, Ward, & Matthews,
2014; Ward, Tan, & Grenfell-Essam, 2010).
Similarly, other studies that have used alternative
methodologies to assess children’s capacity to
hold information active in mind in their “focus of
attention” have also produced capacity estimates
that show considerable developmental change
(Cowan et al., 2005; Hall, Jarrold, Towse, &
Zarandi, 2015).
This raises the possibility that De Alwis et al.
(2009) were premature to assume that the ﬁnal
items on a free-recall list are necessarily held in
primary memory. As the Tulving and Colotla
(1970) procedure makes clear, this assumption
depends on individuals beginning their recall with
items towards the end of the just-presented list. If
participants begin with initial list items, then
their ability to recall the ﬁnal items on the list
would, instead, depend on secondary memory
capacity under this dual-system account (Craik &
Birtwistle, 1971). In addition, if older individuals
are more likely to begin recall at the start than at
the end of the list, then age differences in recall
of these initial list positions are very likely to be
observed (cf. Unsworth et al., 2011).
A crucial point is that earlier studies of children’s
immediate free recall that have led to the claim of
development invariance in primary memory (Cole
et al., 1971, Thurm & Glanzer, 1971) have also
not reported the order of participants’ recall. This
substantially constrains the conclusions that can
be drawn from them regarding the development
of either primary or secondary memory (cf. Cuvo,
1975). Although there is recent work that has esti-
mated adolescents’ primary and secondary memory
capacities from immediate free recall using the
Tulving and Colotla (1970) method, and which
has done so by rightly focusing on those individuals
who tended to commence recall with list-ﬁnal
items (Gibson et al., 2009), that study did not
examine developmental differences in these esti-
mates. The main objective of the current pair of
studies was to rectify this situation and to properly
examine age-related changes in potential indices of
primary memory capacity by recording output order
information from immediate free recall
(Experiment 1) and by encouraging individuals to
begin free recall towards the end of the list
(Experiment 2). As already noted, a subsidiary
aim was to examine the extent to which one can
extract a valid measure of primary memory capacity
from children’s free-recall performance.
EXPERIMENT 1
The ﬁrst experiment examined the development of
immediate free recall across a sample of 5- to 6-
year-olds and a sample of 7- to 8-year-olds. A stan-
dard immediate recall task was given to both age
groups, using a broadly similar procedure to that
employed by De Alwis et al. (2009). However, as
well as recording individuals’ recall accuracy across
the serial positions of each list, the order in which
participants outputted each item during their
recall was noted. Items were presented at the rate
of 1 item per second. This relatively rapid presen-
tation rate was adopted for two reasons. First, it
was expected to discourage any strategic rehearsal
processes that might otherwise take place during
extended intervals between items, and that might
also differ between age groups independently of
any differences in primary memory capacity (e.g.,
Lehmann & Hasselhorn, 2007). Indeed in their
study of the capacity of the focus of attention in
children, Cowan et al. (2005) explicitly noted that
“rapid or unpredictable” presentation is one
method that can be used to reduce the contribution
of strategic inﬂuences to the estimate of this
capacity (or, in our terms, primary memory).
Second, it allowed for a comparison with the De
Alwis et al. (2009) study where the same presen-
tation rate was employed. Having said this, while
De Alwis et al. (2009) employed 14-item lists,
the current study presented 9-item lists to both
age groups, partially to reduce fatigue effects in
this somewhat younger sample, but also because
other work has shown that even adults tend to
begin their free recall with list-ﬁnal items once
lists exceed ﬁve items in length (Ward et al.,
2010). Indeed, Ward et al. (2010) found that
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adults commenced immediate free recall from 9-
item lists with one of the ﬁnal four items on the
list on approximately 70% of occasions (and this
ﬁgure was not substantially different for longer
lists, including 14-item lists). Similarly, Thurm
and Glanzer (1971) varied list length from 2 to 7
in their study of 5- and 6-year-olds’ free recall
and showed standard, and consistent, serial pos-
ition curves for list lengths 5 to 7. Consequently,
though shorter than the list lengths used in many
previous studies of children’s free recall, a 9-item
list length was assumed to be sufﬁciently long to
produce expected serial position effects and to
allow participants to elect begin their recall
towards the end of the list.
Method
Participants
Parental consent was obtained from a total of 136
pupils in Year 1 and Year 3 of two local primary
schools providing mainstream education and with
close to national average levels of pupil attainment.
Four participants did not provide data due to
absences or noncompliance. Consequently, in
total, data from 70 Year 1 pupils (42 males) and
62 Year 3 pupils (23 males) were analysed. The
mean age for Year 1 children was 6:03 (range=
5:09–6:08), and for Year 3 children was 8:03 (range
= 7:09–8:09).
Materials
A corpus of 81 words was selected for use in the
free-recall task. Care was taken to ensure that the
words employed would be familiar to all partici-
pants. Words were therefore concrete nouns
taken from the set found in Morrison, Chappell,
and Ellis (1997) and were selected on the basis of
age-of-acquisition ratings provided in that work.
The “objective age-of-acquisition” rating provided
by Morrison et al. (1997) corresponds to the age
at which 75% of children are expected to know a
given word. The mean value of this rating for the
word set was 42.3 months (SD= 13.7), and the
maximum value was 70.8 months, corresponding
to the lowest age of the youngest children in the
study (see above). Twenty-eight of the items in
the pool contained two syllables, and the remaining
53 were one-syllable words. These words were pre-
sented both auditorily and pictorially. Where
necessary, silence was added to the end of an utter-
ance so that all audio recordings were 750 ms in
duration. The pictorial representations of the
items consisted of black-on-white line drawings,
the majority of which were adapted from
Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980). Additional
drawings for items not provided by the Snodgrass
set were also created.
Procedure
Participants were tested in a single session lasting
approximately 20 minutes that also contained a
number of other memory tasks not reported here.
The free-recall task contained eight test trials, pre-
ceded by a single practice trial, each of which con-
sisted of the sequential presentation of a nine-word
list. Stimuli were presented both visually and audi-
torily on a laptop computer at a rate of 1 item per
second. This dual mode of presentation was
employed because participants were too young to
read written stimuli, and presenting pictures
without an accompanying verbal label could lead
to incorrect encoding if a participant generated a
non-normative label for an image. Similarly, pre-
senting stimuli in an auditory format only would
lead to the risk of participants mishearing an
item, particularly given the use of a relatively large
and open set of stimuli. At the end of each trial,
recall was prompted by the appearance of a
cartoon character. Participants were instructed
that they could recall the items in any order.
Responses and their order were recorded by hand
by the experimenter. To maximize the accuracy of
this scoring, the experimenter utilized a response
sheet that listed the items presented on each trial
and simply annotated the order in which any item
was recalled; any intrusions were also noted.
Results
Analysis of recall performance aggregated across all
trials regardless of output order
In order to compare the serial position effects in the
current data with those reported by De Alwis et al.
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(2009), an initial analysis focused on average recall
by serial position across all trials of the task. These
data are plotted for each age group in Figure 1. The
graph indicates that all participants showed rela-
tively little primacy in their free-recall performance,
with the serial position curves being marked by
poor recall for items 1 to 6 in the list and better per-
formance on items 7 to 9 with a strong recency gra-
dient across these latter positions. Another point to
note is that the performance of the two age groups
appears to be similar on the ﬁnal three positions of
the list, but differs more clearly across the ﬁrst six
list positions (cf. De Alwis et al., 2009). A formal
analysis that compared the two age groups across
the nine serial positions of the list revealed a signiﬁ-
cant main effect of age group, F(1, 130)= 32.62,
p, .001, MSE= 0.10, h2P = .201, due to poorer
overall recall of items in the Year 1 (M= 2.67,
SD= 0.50) than in the Year 3 (M= 3.18, SD=
0.54) children. However, this was qualiﬁed by a sig-
niﬁcant interaction between age group and serial
position, F(8, 1040)= 2.02, p= .042, MSE=
0.03, h2P = .015. Given our interest in the claim
for differential age effects on the different portions
of the serial position curve, post hoc analysis of this
interaction examined the simple main effect of age
group on average recall across the ﬁrst three, the
middle three, and the ﬁnal three serial positions
separately. These showed that the effect of age
group was signiﬁcant on the ﬁrst three, F(1,
130)= 21.23, p, .001, MSE= 0.02, h2P = .140,
and the middle three items, F(1, 130)= 8.08,
p= .005, MSE= 0.01, h2P = .059, but not on the
ﬁnal three items on the list, F(1, 130)= 1.83,
p= .179, MSE= 0.02, h2P = .014.
Analyses of output order data
The above analysis therefore replicates De Alwis
and colleagues’ (2009) ﬁndings in showing that
age differences in children’s free recall are apparent
on the early-presented but not the late-presented
items on the list. However, the fact that the order
of participants’ responses was recorded in this
experiment allows for two further analyses that
are standardly employed in the adult literature
(see Farrell, 2012; Howard & Kahana, 1999;
Kahana, 1996; Ward et al., 2010), but have not
been reported in previous studies of children’s free
recall. The ﬁrst of these is an analysis of the lag
between successive responses in an individual’s
output—that is, the difference between the pos-
itions in the input list of two successive responses
in the output. This shows the extent to which par-
ticipants recall in forwards serial order (recalling
item X and then item X+ 1 from the input list is
a lag of +1) as well as all other possible movements
between items. Typically, researchers analyse indi-
viduals’ “lag conditional response probabilities” or
lag-CRPs (Kahana, 1996), and this approach was
adopted here. This involves conditionalizing the
likelihood of an individual making a response tran-
sition of a given lag against the opportunities for
that transition to have taken place (e.g., an individ-
ual who always begins recall with the last item on
the list can never make a +8 transition however
many responses they go on to produce).
Speciﬁcally, for each individual the number of
−8 to +8 lag transitions made across all eight
trials of the task were conditionalized against the
opportunities to make such transitions. On 76 of
the 1056 trials in the experiment a participant
only recalled one item, thereby providing no lag-
CRP data on that trial. However, 122 children pro-
duced lag-CRP data on all eight trials of the task,
four produced data on seven trials, four on six,
one on four, and one on just two trials. In addition,
if there were no opportunities to make a certain lag
transition across all trials then this cell was coded as
Figure 1. Free-recall accuracy by serial position and age group for all
trials in Experiment 1 (error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals).
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missing data. As a result, not all individuals pro-
vided CRPs for all possible lags. In order to main-
tain an appropriate number of participants for
analysis (cf. Kahana, 1996), we therefore con-
sidered the two age groups’ tendency to produce
−3 to +3 lags, and these data are plotted in
Figure 2. Sixty-one Year 1 and 55 Year 3 children
provided data for this comparison.
Analysis of variance of these CRPs with
the factors of lag (−3 to −1, +1 to +3) and
age group revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of
lag, F(5, 570)= 83.275, p, .001, MSE= 0.03,
h2P = .422; as Figure 2 shows, +1 lags were par-
ticularly common, a ﬁnding observed in the adult
literature and termed the “lag recency effect”
(Howard & Kahana, 1999). Neither the main
effect of age group, F(1, 114)= 0.20, p= .654,
MSE= 0.02, h2P = .002, nor the interaction
between lag and age group, F(5, 570)= 1.01,
p= .414,MSE= 0.03, h2P = .009, was signiﬁcant.
A further a priori analysis examined+1 lags only in
the full sample of 132 participants and showed that
the effect of age group on the tendency to run in
forwards serial order was nonsigniﬁcant, F(1,
130)= 1.85, p= .176, MSE= 0.06, h2P = .014.
The second analysis that involved information
about the order of an individual’s recall examined
participants’ probability of ﬁrst recall functions
(Howard & Kahana, 1999)—that is, individuals’
tendency to start their output with items at differ-
ent positions in the input list. Figure 3 plots the
probability of ﬁrst recall data—that is, the prob-
ability with which individuals in each age group
began their recall at a given serial position on a
list, averaged across the eight trials of the free-
recall task. Analysis of these data with the factors
of age group and serial position revealed a signiﬁ-
cant interaction between the two factors, F(8,
1040)= 2.65, p= .007, MSE= 0.02, h2P = .020.
Post hoc analysis of the simple main effects of age
group at each serial position showed a signiﬁcant
age difference only at serial position 1, F(1,
130)= 11.59, p= .001, MSE= 0.03, h2P = .082,
as individuals in Year 3 were more likely than
those in Year 1 to begin recall with the ﬁrst item
on the list [the corresponding statistic for serial
position 7 was F(1, 130)= 3.28, p= .072,
MSE= 0.02, h2P = .025].
Conditionalizing serial position functions by recall
starting position
The ﬁnal series of analyses integrated the previous
two and was motivated by the fact that some indi-
viduals, particularly in Year 3, began recall with the
ﬁrst item on the just-presented list. This pattern is
clearly problematic for the Tulving and Colotla
(1970) method of estimating primary and second-
ary memory scores from free-recall performance.
On a 9-item list of the kind employed here, output-
ting the ﬁrst item ﬁrst corresponds to an ITRI of 8,
which would place that item in secondary memory
under the typical adult scoring criterion. Given this
Figure 2. Lag conditional response probabilities in Experiment 1
(error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals).
Figure 3. Probability of ﬁrst recall by serial position and age group,
averaged across all eight trials in Experiment 1 (error bars are 95%
conﬁdence intervals).
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problem, and the fact that the clear majority of trials
involved ﬁrst recall from position 1, 7, 8 or 9 of the
list (81.3% of trials in Year 1, 86.1% in Year 3, see
Figure 3), the effect of individuals commencing free
recall at different list positions was examined by
replotting serial position functions separately for
trials when recall began at each of these four pos-
itions. These graphs are shown in Figure 4, and
Table 1 summarizes the number of individuals in
each age group who provided data for these
ﬁgures and the average number of trials on which
recall commenced at each position for each
individual.
Table 1 clearly shows that not all individuals
contributed data to each of the panels in Figure
4 (only 13 individuals across both age groups
provided data for all four ﬁgures simultaneously).
Consequently, analysis of these serial position
curves was carried out for each starting position
separately, and the interpretation of the patterns
observed should bear in mind the fact that differ-
ent participants contribute to each dataset. These
analyses broke serial position down into start,
middle, and ﬁnal list position groups. Items 1
to 3 were classed as start positions, items 4 to 6
were termed middle positions, and the ﬁnal pos-
itions were items 7 to 9. However, in each analy-
sis the start position was excluded from the
calculation of average recall in each triad
because conditionalizing recall by start position
necessarily produced ceiling performance at this
position.
Figure 4. Free-recall accuracy by serial position and age group for trials where participants commenced recall with the item presented at list
position 1 (Panel A), list position 7 (Panel B), list position 8 (Panel C), or list position 9 (Panel D) (error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals).
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When recall began at serial position 1 (Figure 4,
Panel A), the two groups showed broadly compar-
able levels of overall recall, F(1, 60)= 0.91,
p= .344, MSE= 0.72, h2P = .015, and the inter-
action between age group and serial position
(triad) was not signiﬁcant, F(2, 120)= 0.75,
p= .471, MSE= 0.40, h2P = .012. In contrast,
when recall commenced with the item at position
7 (Figure 4, panel B), Year 3 children showed sig-
niﬁcantly greater recall accuracy, F(1, 77)= 10.58,
p= .002,MSE= 0.32, h2P = .121. The interaction
between factors was not signiﬁcant at the 5%
level, F(2, 154)= 2.38, p= .096, MSE= 0.35,
h2P = .030, but was explored by further post hoc
analysis of simple main effects. This showed that
the two age groups did not differ signiﬁcantly in
performance on the start positions, F(1, 77)=
1.62, p= .208, MSE= 0.02, h2P = .021, but that
there was a trend towards a recall advantage for
Year 3 children on middle positions, F(1, 77)=
3.82, p= .054, MSE= 0.01, h2P = .047, and a
signiﬁcant group difference in favour of Year 3
individuals on the ﬁnal positions (positions 8
and 9), F(1, 77)= 5.82, p= .018, MSE= 0.08,
h2P = .070.
When recall began with the item at serial pos-
ition 8 (Figure 4, Panel C), Year 3 individuals
again showed signiﬁcantly greater recall accuracy
than Year 1 children, F(1, 84)= 4.54, p= .036,
MSE= 0.03, h2P = .051, but there was no evidence
of a reliable interaction with serial position, F(2,
168)= 0.96, p= .384, MSE= 0.35, h2P = .001.
The main effect of age group was signiﬁcant
when recall commenced with the item from serial
position 9 (Figure 4, panel D), F(1, 120)= 10.76,
p= .001,MSE= 0.16, h2P = .082. The interaction
between factors was not signiﬁcant at the 5%
level, F(2, 240)= 2.60, p= .076, MSE= 0.21,
h2P = .021. Supplementary post hoc analysis of
simple main effects showed that Year 3 children
signiﬁcantly outperformed Year 1 individuals on
the start positions, F(1, 120)= 11.90, p= .001,
MSE= 0.18, h2P = .090, and middle positions, F(1,
120)= 4.31, p= .040, MSE= 0.16, h2P = .035, but
not end positions (items 7 and 8), F(1, 120), 0.01,
p= .979, MSE= 0.25, h2P = .001.
Discussion
The main aim of this ﬁrst experiment was to
examine the development of immediate free-recall
performance and the extent to which this can be
used to provide an index of children’s primary
memory capacity. Thus we tested the claim, made
consistently in previous studies of children’s
immediate free recall, that primary memory does
not develop in middle childhood (De Alwis et al.,
2009; Jablonski, 1974; Thurm & Glanzer, 1971).
The ﬁrst point to note is that we essentially repli-
cated earlier developmental studies of immediate
free recall. The serial position functions that are
shown in Figure 1 show less evidence of a
primacy effect than those reported by De Alwis
et al. (2009) and than is seen in adults’ immediate
free-recall data (Farrell, 2012; Ward et al., 2010).
However, De Alwis et al.’s sample included chil-
dren aged up to 16 years, who might well be
expected to show an adult pattern of performance,
and primacy effects in immediate free recall are
often absent in studies of younger children
Table 1. Summary data for participants in each age group who began free recall at a particular list position in Experiment 1
Year group
Starting position
1 7 8 9
n No. of trials n No. of trials n No. of trials n No. of trials
Year 1 23 1.78 (0.85) 47 1.79 (1.04) 47 1.44 (0.62) 63 4.21 (1.98)
Year 3 39 2.11 (1.52) 32 1.61 (0.83) 39 1.53 (0.71) 59 3.98 (1.96)
Note: Number of individuals starting at each position and the average number of trials started at that position by each individual are
shown. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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(Hasher & Clifton, 1974; Jablonski, 1974). It
should also be noted that the use of auditory
support alongside visual presentation of the mem-
oranda in the current experiment is likely to
increase the size of any recency effects on recall rela-
tive to those observed with visual-only presentation
(Crowder & Morton, 1969). However, given that
we adopted a fast presentation rate to discourage
rehearsal of information, we see no strong reason
to suspect that this would differentially have
affected either age group’s recall of list-ﬁnal
items. Indeed, when the nine presented items
were split into three groups of three for analysis,
Year 3 individuals recalled signiﬁcantly more
initial list items than Year 1 children but the
groups did not differ reliably in their ability to
recall ﬁnal list items. This pattern is entirely con-
sistent with the ﬁndings from previous studies of
children’s immediate free recall (Cole et al., 1971;
De Alwis et al., 2009; Thurm & Glanzer, 1971)
that, crucially, led these authors to conclude that
primary memory does not develop with age.
Another ﬁnding that might, at least initially,
be seen to be consistent with this claim is the
fact that the conditional response probabilities
produced by the two age groups were similar to
one another (see Figure 2). In particular, both
age groups showed the same tendency to recall
items in forwards serial order. Serial ordering is
a hallmark of short-term memory, and one
might argue that the comparable tendency of
the two age groups to make +1 lags in their
responses shows comparable primary memory
capacity. We return to this point below, but
ﬁrst note that while these aspects of our data
appear to support the view that primary memory
does not develop with age, other results favour
the opposite conclusion.
In this regard, it is important to note that,
while participants did show a strong tendency to
begin recall with the last item on the list, there
was a reasonable proportion of trials on which
they began with the ﬁrst list item. In addition,
any tendency to begin recall at the start of the
list was more common in Year 3 than in Year 1
children. Clearly, participants are likely to begin
recall with items that they are conﬁdent of recal-
ling correctly. Consequently, one would expect
Year 3 children, who showed a greater tendency
to start recall at the start of the list, to also show
superior recall of initial list items (cf. Bjork &
Whitten, 1974; Unsworth et al., 2011). By exten-
sion, it is possible that the age effects on recall of
initial list items seen in previous studies (see
above) reﬂect the fact that older children were
more likely than younger children to begin recall
at the start of the list.
It is, of course, possible that individuals selec-
tively rehearse only initial list items to keep them
active in primary memory, and that this is the
reason why they begin recall with these items.
However, without any corroborating evidence that
this is occurring, one cannot be certain that initial
list items are being recalled from this system. As
a result, trials on which recall begins with items
from the start of the list do not provide interpret-
able data for the measurement of primary memory
capacity. Instead, according to Tulving and
Colotla (1970), the assessment of primary
memory capacity should focus solely on those
trials when list-ﬁnal items are recalled ﬁrst. A
point to note from Figure 3 is that while children
were most likely to begin recall with the ﬁnal
item on the list, there was also a relatively strong
tendency among all individuals to start recall with
the 7th item. Indeed, participants were about as
likely to begin recall with item 7 as they were
with item 8.
Such a pattern of nonmonotonic decline in the
probability of ﬁrst recall from the end of the list is
sometimes observed in adult data (Farrell, 2010;
Howard & Kahana, 1999; Murdock, 1962;
Murdock & Okada, 1970; Roberts, 1972) and is
potentially in line with the claim that participants
do, at least on some trials, begin recall by output-
ting the contents of primary memory. Assuming
that primary memory is subject to something akin
to a primacy gradient that leads to forwards serial
recall (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2002; Page &
Norris, 1998), then a sensible approach to recalling
from primary memory on an immediate free-recall
task would be to begin recall X items in from the
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end of the list, where X corresponds to the number
of items in primary memory that can be successfully
recalled in forwards serial order (Howard &
Kahana, 1999).2
If this relative peak in the probability of ﬁrst
recall functions shown in Figure 3 does indeed
reﬂect participants outputting from primary
memory, then the data most relevant to the ques-
tion of whether primary memory indices from
free recall change with age are the serial position
functions that result when recall starts from pos-
ition 7 (Figure 4, Panel B). In contrast to what is
observed when performance is averaged across the
whole experiment, on these trials Year 3 children
recalled signiﬁcantly more items than did Year 1
individuals from positions 8 and 9 of the list. If it
is the case that initial free recall of list-ﬁnal items
reﬂects an individual’s primary memory capacity,
then these data suggest that primary memory
capacity does increase with age in children.
Although the lag-CRP analysis showed that the
two groups had a comparable tendency to recall
in forwards serial order, it is perfectly possible
that this simply reﬂects the use of primary
memory to drive response output. The same prob-
ability of forwards ordering for any given pair of
successive responses might therefore be expected,
even if the two groups did have different primary
memory capacities.
EXPERIMENT 2
The above discussion highlights the difﬁculty in
making direct comparisons between the various
panels shown in Figure 4, which are drawn from
different subsets of participants in each year group
in each case. Experiment 2 therefore borrowed a
methodology from Dalezman (1976; see also
Bruce & Papay, 1970; Cowan, Saults, Elliott, &
Moreno, 2002) to prompt participants to begin
their recall at a given position of the input list.
Speciﬁcally, nine-item lists were again presented,
but were divided into two sublists by a change
in the presentation context. Participants were
told in advance to prioritize recall of the second
set of items. They were not explicitly instructed
to commence recall with the very ﬁrst of the
second set items. However, we assumed that this
manipulation would substantially increase the
number of trials on which participants did in fact
begin recall with the ﬁrst item within the second
set.
The number of items in this second set was
varied from 2 to 4, in order to prompt recall from
the 8th, 7th, or 6th position of the input list. We
restricted the experimental manipulation to probe
just these three positions, partly to avoid fatigue
effects among our developmental sample, but pri-
marily because of our focus on the development
of potential indices of primary memory.
Experiment 1 highlighted the relevance of data
from trials in which recall commenced from pos-
ition 7 of a nine-item list. However, it was less
clear whether age effects were seen on list-ﬁnal
items when recall began at position 8; although
age differences in total recall were seen in this
case, they were driven by differences in recall
of items at the start of the list (see Figure 4,
Panel C). In addition, prompting recall from list
position 6 allowed us to investigate whether partici-
pants of this age had recall capacities that exceeded
three items. Recall from list position 1 was not
prompted because including trials where recall
was prompted from the ﬁrst list position would
have led participants to focus their attention, to
some extent at least, on the start of the list.
Rather, in this second experiment we wished to
examine age differences in children’s ability to
recall list-ﬁnal items under conditions in which
they attempted to keep these items, and these
items only, active in memory.
2A potentially alternative explanation of the relative peak in the probability of ﬁrst recall function at list position 7 is that partici-
pants might be grouping the nine-item list into three subgroups each of three items. One slight problem for this view is that there is no
evidence in Figure 2 of any increase in probability of ﬁrst recall for item 4, which would be the ﬁrst item in the middle group under such
a strategy. In addition, grouping the list in threes might simply be the consequence of participants having a primary memory capacity of
about three items that allows them to recall from position 7 with relatively good accuracy (cf. Farrell, 2012).
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Method
Participants
Parental consent was obtained from a total of 99
pupils in Years 1 and 3 of two local primary
schools providing mainstream education, and
with close to national average published attainment
levels. Two participants did not provide complete
data due to absences or noncompliance, but full
data were obtained from 61 Year 1 pupils (29
males) and 36 Year 3 pupils (20 males). The
mean age of the Year 1 group was 6:05 (range=
5:11–6:10), and the mean age of the Year 3 group
was 8:05 (range= 7:10–8:10), in both cases
closely matching the distribution of ages of the par-
ticipants seen in Experiment 1.
Materials
Stimuli were drawn from a pool of 315 concrete
nouns that were selected using the same criteria
as those in Experiment 1. As in that experiment,
approximately one third of items were two-syllable
words, and two thirds were one-syllable items.
Stimuli were again presented both auditorily and
pictorially.
Procedure
Participants were tested in a single session lasting
approximately 20 min. The task consisted of 30
test trials that were preceded by three practice
trials. On any trial, the participant was presented
with nine stimuli. These were presented sequen-
tially at a rate of one item per second, with a pictor-
ial representation of each to-be-remembered word,
accompanied by simultaneous auditory presen-
tation of that word. The ﬁrst items on a trial were
presented within a blue square in the centre of
the screen, and the ﬁnal items on a trial were pre-
sented within a red ﬂash. Participants were told
that they should try to recall both “blue” and
“red” items, but that they would score more
points for recalling red items. Three points were
awarded to the participant for the recall of each
red item, and 1 point was awarded for the recall
of each blue item. Participants were shown the
number of points that they had scored at the
halfway point and at the end of the experiment.
There were three experimental conditions
formed by variation of the number of blue and
red items on a trial. In 5–4 trials, the ﬁrst 5 list
items were presented within the blue square, and
the ﬁnal 4 items were presented within the red
ﬂash; in 6–3 trials, the ﬁrst 6 items were blue
items, and the last 3 were red items; in 7–2 trials,
the ﬁrst 7 items were blue items, and the ﬁnal 2
were red items. There were 10 trials in each con-
dition, and trials from each condition were inter-
leaved with one another in a predetermined, but
apparently random, order.
At the end of any trial, recall of the red items
was prompted by the appearance of a red ﬂash.
Participants were allowed 8 s to recall as many
red items as they could, and these, and any erro-
neous responses, were recorded by the exper-
imenter in the manner employed in Experiment
1. After 8 seconds had elapsed, a blue square
appeared on the screen to prompt recall of the
items presented in the blue phase of the trial.
Participants had an unlimited time to recall blue
items, and the experimenter recorded their
responses and terminated the trial when they
were satisﬁed that no more items would be
recalled. Recall of red phase items always took
place before the recall of blue phase items.
Because of our interest in the recall of list-ﬁnal
items at the start of an individual’s recall phase,
the analyses reported below concentrate primarily
on red phase recall of red items. However, we
begin by reporting data that also include details
of recall of blue items, in order to provide a
summary of participants’ performance across the
whole task.
Results
Preliminary error analysis
An initial analysis examined task compliance in the
two age groups in order to assess whether the pro-
cedure was properly understood, even by the
younger participants. Across all trials, there was
no signiﬁcant effect of age group on the average
number of blue items incorrectly recalled during
the red recall phase per trial, F(1, 95)= 1.09,
p= .299, MSE= 0.042, h2P = .011, and the
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average number of such errors was low (Year 1,
M= 0.21, SD= 0.21; Year 3, M= 0.17, SD =
0.20). Similarly, the effect of age group on the
average number of red items recalled in the blue
recall phase was nonsigniﬁcant, F(1, 95)= 0.10,
p= .756, MSE= 0.007, h2P = .001, and this
error pattern was even less common (Year 1,
M= 0.08, SD= 0.08; Year 3, M= 0.08, SD=
0.09).
Analysis of recall performance aggregated across all
trials regardless of output order
Average correct recall of each item in each recall
phase is plotted for each age group in Figure 5.
These graphs show strong recency effects in the
correct recall of red list items and relatively ﬂat
serial position functions for correct recall of blue
items. Analysis of these data was conducted, separ-
ately for each stimulus type (red or blue items), by
averaging across serial position and comparing
across conditions and age groups (an analysis of
serial position effects for red phase recall is reported
in a subsequent section of the results). The analysis
of proportional correct recall of red items showed a
signiﬁcant effect of age group, F(1, 95)= 28.79,
p, .001, MSE= 0.08, h2P = .233, due to superior
recall in Year 3 individuals. The effect of condition
was signiﬁcant, F(2, 190)= 205.43, p, .001,
MSE= 0.01, h2P = .684, but the interaction
between factors was not, F(2, 190)= 0.27,
p= .765,MSE= 0.01, h2P = .003. Post hoc analy-
sis of the condition effect showed that proportional
recall of red items was signiﬁcantly higher in
the 7–2 condition (M= .79, SD= .20) than
in the 6–3 condition (M= .67, SD= .21), which
in turn produced signiﬁcantly greater proportional
recall than the 5–4 condition (M= .52, SD= .19),
t(96)= 9.63, p, .001, t(96)= 12.90, p, .001,
respectively.
The corresponding analysis of correct recall of
blue items in the blue recall phase similarly showed
a signiﬁcant main effect of year group, F(1, 95)=
26.57, p, .001, MSE= 0.01, h2P = .219. The
effect of condition was signiﬁcant, F(2, 190)=
20.97, p, .001, MSE= 0.02, h2P = .181, as was,
in this case, the interaction between factors, F(2,
190)= 5.24, p= .006, MSE= 0.01, h2P = .052.
The interaction reﬂected a larger effect of condition
among Year 3 individuals, F(2, 70)= 9.67, p, .001,
MSE= 0.03, h2P = .217, than among Year 1 par-
ticipants, F(2, 120)= 8.99, p, .001, MSE= 0.01,
h2P = .130. Conversely, the effect of year group
was large and comparable in size for the 7–2 con-
dition, F(1, 95)= 26.44, p, .001, MSE= 0.01,
Figure 5. Free-recall accuracy by serial position and age group for
red phase recall of red items and blue phase recall of blue items in
Experiment 2 (error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals).
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h2P = .218, and the 6–3 condition, F(1, 95)= 26.13,
p, .001, MSE= 0.00, h2P = .216, but smaller
though still signiﬁcant for the 5–4 condition, F(1,
95)= 10.28, p= .002, MSE, 0.01, h2P = .098.
The above analysis indicates that Year 3 children
showed greater proportional recall of blue items than
did Year 1 individuals, but particularly so on trials
when they were required to recall only relatively
few red items in the initial recall phase. One poss-
ible reading of these data is that Year 3 participants
were able to hold a greater total number of items
(red and blue) in mind than Year 1 individuals, so
that provided the number of red items to recall
did not exceed this total, they were able to also
recall more blue items than their younger counter-
parts. To explore this possibility, we conducted an
analysis of the total number of items correctly
recalled across both phases of each trial of each
condition. This revealed a signiﬁcant main effect
of age group, F(1, 95)= 38.34, p, .001, MSE=
1.66, h2P = .288, due to poorer total recall among
Year 1 (M= 2.05, SD= 0.69) than Year 3 (M=
3.02, SD= 0.82) children. The main effect of con-
dition was signiﬁcant, F(2, 190)= 6.77, p= .001,
MSE= 0.12, h2P = .067, but the interaction
between condition and year group was not reliable,
F(2, 190)= 0.25, p= .776, MSE= 0.12,
h2P = .003. The condition effect reﬂected fewer
total items being recalled in the 7–2 condition
(M= 2.31, SD= 0.86) than in either the 6–3
(M= 2.48, SD= 0.93) or the 5–4 condition
(M= 2.43, SD= 0.97). Indeed, there was no sig-
niﬁcant difference in total number of items recalled
across the latter two conditions, F(1, 96)= 1.36,
p= .247, MSE= 0.10, h2P = .01.
Analyses of output order data
Following the analysis strategy of Experiment 1,
output order data from participants’ successful
recall of red phase items were ﬁrst examined in
terms of transitional conditional response probabil-
ities, and then by examining probability of ﬁrst
recall data. Rather than considering CRPs at the
full range of different lags, which varied across con-
ditions, the lag-CRP analysis focused on children’s
tendency to recall in forwards serial order.
Consequently, only +1 lags were subjected to
analysis, which maximized the number of partici-
pants who provided data for this comparison. The
+1 CRP is necessarily 1 for each participant
when considering red phase recall in the 7–2 con-
dition, as recalling the 9th item on the list is the
only possibility for individuals’ second response if
they begin recall with the 8th item on the list. In
a similar vein, although a CRP analysis conditiona-
lizes a given transition against the opportunity to
make such a response, one might argue that
random responding would necessarily lead to
greater +1 lag transitions in the 6–3 than in the
5–4 condition simply because of the greater oppor-
tunity to make other transitions in the latter case.
Given this, the analysis compared the +1 CRPs
for Year 1 (n= 52) and Year 3 (n= 35) children
for their red phase recall in the 6–3 and 5–4 con-
ditions only, but with these probabilities averaged
across these two conditions. The resultant analysis
showed no signiﬁcant effect of group on +1
CRPs, F(1, 85)= 1.05, p= .309, MSE= 0.02,
h2P = .012 (Year 1, M= 0.84, SD= 0.16; Year 3,
M= 0.87, SD= 0.11).
Probability of ﬁrst recall data are plotted by
serial position in Figure 6. Because the main exper-
imental aim of this second study was to encourage
participants to begin their free recall from a certain
point in the list, the analysis of these data was
restricted to individuals’ likelihood of commencing
recall with the ﬁrst red item of the list (i.e.,
the 8th item in the 7–2 trials, the 7th item in the
6–3 trials, the 6th item in the 5–4 trials). Analysis
of these data with the factors of condition and age
group revealed signiﬁcant main effects of condition,
F(2, 190)= 91.69, p, .001, MSE= 0.02,
h2P = .491, and of age group, F(1, 95)= 30.84,
p, .001, MSE= 0.14, h2P = .245. The interaction
between factors was not signiﬁcant at the 5%
level, F(2, 190)= 2.46, p= .089, MSE= 0.02,
h2P = .025. Post hoc analyses of simple main
effects conﬁrmed that Year 3 children were more
likely than were Year 1 individuals to begin recall
with the ﬁrst red item in each condition, although
the magnitude of this year group difference
decreased somewhat with number of red items in
the list: 7–2 condition, F(1, 95)= 34.02,
p, .001, MSE= 0.06, h2P = .264; 6–3 condition,
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F(1, 95)= 21.71, p, .001, MSE= 0.07,
h2P = .186; 5–4 condition, F(1, 95)= 16.24,
p, .001, MSE= 0.05, h2P = .146.
Conditionalizing serial position functions by recall
starting position
As Figure 6 shows, children did not always begin
recall in the red phase with the ﬁrst red item on
the list, although importantly this did occur on a
sizeable proportion of trials, particularly in the
Year 3 group. Therefore, to directly compare the
results of this second experiment to those of
Experiment 1 (cf. Figure 4), a ﬁnal analysis of
recall accuracy was conducted on data from only
those trials on which individuals began red phase
recall with the ﬁrst red item in the just-presented
list. Recall accuracy by serial position for such
trials is plotted for each age group and condition
in Figure 7. In the 7–2 condition, 57 Year 1 and
Figure 6. Probability of ﬁrst recall by serial position and age group
for the red recall phase of each condition of Experiment 2 (error bars
are 95% conﬁdence intervals).
Figure 7. Free-recall accuracy by serial position and age group for
trials where red phase recall commenced with the ﬁrst red item in
the list, plotted by condition of Experiment 2 (error bars are 95%
conﬁdence intervals).
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36 Year 3 children provided at least one trial’s
worth of data for this analysis. In the 6–3 condition,
the corresponding numbers were 49 and 33, and in
the 5–4 condition they were 33 and 26.
Necessarily, individuals perform at ceiling on
their recall of the ﬁrst red item in the list under
this approach. Consequently, analysis of age
group differences in recall focused only on the
items following this start position. Serial position
effects were not examined directly because, once
the initial item is excluded, they are not particularly
informative. In addition, because the number of
individuals providing data in each condition
varied (see above), condition was not included as
a factor in this analysis initially. For each condition,
the effect of age group on recall of the average per-
formance on nonstart red items was signiﬁcant: 7–2
condition, F(1, 91)= 7.57, p= .007,MSE= 0.07,
h2P = .077; 6–3 condition, F(1, 81)= 14.11,
p, .001, MSE= 0.08, h2P = .148; 5–4 condition,
F(1, 57)= 14.41, p, .001, MSE= 0.09,
h2P = .202. A further analysis then compared
these averages across conditions for the 30 Year 1
and the 26 Year 3 children who provided data in
all three conditions. In this analysis, the main
effect of condition was signiﬁcant, F(2, 108)=
53.34, p, .001, MSE= 0.03, h2P = .497, as was
the main effect of age group, F(1, 54)= 11.50,
p= .001, MSE= 0.15, h2P = .176. However, the
interaction between these two factors was not sig-
niﬁcant, F(2, 108)= 1.84, p= .163, MSE= 0.03,
h2P = .033. Post hoc comparisons showed that
recall of the ﬁnal red item in the 7–2 condition
(M= .91, SD= .24) was signiﬁcantly more accu-
rate than the average of items 8 and 9 in the 6–3
condition (M= .83, SD= .27), which in turn was
higher than average recall across the last three red
items in the 5–4 condition (M= .58, SD= .33)
[t(55)= 2.73, p= .009; t(55)= 7.25, p, .001,
respectively].
Discussion
In Experiment 1, we argued that there is a develop-
mental improvement in children’s ability to recall
list-ﬁnal items in free recall, but that this becomes
manifest only when individuals began their recall
with an item that was presented towards the end
of the input list. Since participants were free to com-
mence recall at any serial position, the number of
trials providing data for this key analysis was not
as high as it might have been and varied consider-
ably across individuals. In Experiment 2, we speciﬁ-
cally encouraged recall of late-presented items. One
might argue that this reduces the task to a cued,
rather than free, recall procedure, and that as a con-
sequence the ﬁndings are not easily generalizable to
other free-recall data. While the current task clearly
does differ from the procedure employed in
Experiment 1, it is important to note that nine
items were again presented on each trial, and that
these stimuli were all presented in the same way
(using the same voice and with similar pictures) in
both the blue and red phases of the trial. In addition,
although many of the analyses above focus on just
the recall of red items, it should not be forgotten
that participants were instructed to try to remember
both red and blue items on each trial.
Consequently, while the current procedure
shares many similarities with recent free-recall
studies that have presented adults with very short
lists (Grenfell-Essam & Ward, 2012; Grenfell-
Essam, Ward, & Tan, 2013; Ward et al., 2010),
it does differ from that approach in important
respects. In essence a contextual change prompts
a particular focus on a subset of list-ﬁnal items,
and the recall instructions encourage the participant
to begin their recall with these items, but other
items are presented and are also probed. We
would therefore argue that this paradigm does
provide an appropriate means of assessing chil-
dren’s free-recall behaviour when they start their
recall by outputting items from the end of the
list. Indeed, the total number of items recalled by
children in this experiment (red items in the red
recall phase plus blue items in the blue recall
phase) was broadly similar to that recalled from
the standard free-recall task used in Experiment
1. Speciﬁcally, in Experiment 1, Year 1 and Year
3 children recalled 2.7 and 3.2 items on average
from a 9-item list (see Experiment 1 results).
Here the corresponding values were 2.1 and 3.0
items. Although the value for Year 1 children is
somewhat lower in the current experiment, Year 3
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children appear to be recalling a very similar
number of items across the two tasks, suggesting
that they do not assess fundamentally different
processes.
Having said this, it is clear that children of
different ages could differ either in their ability
to understand the task instructions or in their
ability to make use of the contextual cue that
prompts a particular focus on these list-ﬁnal items
(cf. Davelaar, Goshen-Gottstein, Ashkenazi,
Haarmann, & Usher, 2005). McCormack,
Brown, Vousden, and Henson (2000) found a
developmental improvement in the positional accu-
racy with which memoranda were recalled in chil-
dren’s immediate serial recall, and it is certainly
possible that younger children might have a less
distinct or accurate temporal representation of the
start point of the red sublist. The fact that Year 1
children tended to recall somewhat fewer total
items in this second experiment than they did in
Experiment 1 might therefore suggest a failure to
understand the task. However, this concern is miti-
gated considerably by the ﬁnding that the number
of errors involving recall of a red list item in the
blue recall phase (and vice versa) was extremely
low and did not interact with age group.
Consequently, it appeared that both age groups
fully understood the task requirements and that
even the younger children had a clear temporal rep-
resentation of the start of the red sublist.
Consistent with this suggestion, and as Figure
6 shows, on a sizeable proportion of trials partici-
pants did commence recall of the probed (red)
items with the ﬁrst item in that set (cf. Figure
3). In fact, although this experiment included
fewer Year 3 than Year 1 individuals overall, a
comparable number of participants in each age
group began their red phase recall with the ﬁrst
item in the red list on at least one trial in each
condition (n= 30 and 26, respectively). This
second experiment was therefore successful in
increasing the likelihood of participants starting
recall from a just-presented list at a certain
position and therefore had even greater power
than Experiment 1 to detect age differences
in recall performance under these conditions.
Furthermore, even if younger individuals did
have a less precise temporal representation of
this sublist starting position, the analyses that
were restricted to trials on which recall did
begin with the ﬁrst item on the red list are par-
ticularly well placed to address this question. In
this regard the results were clear, as Year 3 indi-
viduals were more successful at recalling red items
than were Year 1 participants in each of the three
conditions. If previous authors are correct in
suggesting that just-presented items are held in
primary memory in a free-recall task, particularly
a task such as this in which participants are expli-
citly discouraged from selectively maintaining list-
initial items for recall, then these ﬁndings clearly
suggest that primary memory does develop in
children.
We also found, through the analysis of +1 lag
CRPs, that the two age groups had a comparable
tendency to recall in forwards serial order.
Although one must be wary of reading too much
into a null effect, this implies that younger chil-
dren were just as likely as older children to recall
in forwards order, despite being less likely to
start recall with the ﬁrst item in the red sublist.
We would argue that this pattern is consistent
with the claim that younger children had a
smaller recall capacity than older individuals. Put
another way, older individuals were able to recall
in forwards serial order a larger number of list-
ﬁnal items than were younger children and so
tended to begin their recall nearer to the start of
the red sublist. Indeed, the probability of ﬁrst
recall data plotted in Figure 6 show that Year 3
children tended to begin red phase recall with
the ﬁrst red item on the list when there were
two or three red items on that list; in the 5–4 con-
dition they were equally likely to begin recall with
the ﬁrst or the last red item. In contrast, Year 1
children showed a comparable tendency to start
recall with either red item in the 7–2 condition,
but were relatively unlikely to begin with the
ﬁrst red item when there were more than two
red items in the list. This suggests that Year 1
children have a recall capacity that is not much
more than two items, while Year 3 children tend
to be able to recall at least three items from the
list, values that are consistent with the estimates
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of total number of items recall across red and blue
recall phases discussed above.3
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The main aim of these experiments was to examine
age-related changes in children’s ability to recall
list-ﬁnal items in free-recall tasks. This was done
to test the claim that primary memory capacity is
age invariant, which in turn rests on the assumption
that list-ﬁnal items in free recall are output ﬁrst by
virtue of being held in a form that makes them
immediately available to conscious access. As out-
lined initially, the claim of developmental invar-
iance in primary memory capacity runs counter to
considerable evidence of developmental improve-
ments on tests of immediate serial recall and
measures of the size of children’s focus of attention
(e.g., Cowan et al., 2005), but is one that has been
made both historically (e.g., Jablonski, 1974) and
more recently (De Alwis et al., 2009) in the litera-
ture. It is also an important one to test, given the
growing interest in the use of free recall as means
of extracting primary memory capacity estimates
for use in wider correlational studies (Gibson
et al., 2009, 2013; Unsworth et al., 2011;
Unsworth et al., 2010). The previous evidence for
this position comes exclusively from the absence
of age-related differences in children’s recall of
the ﬁnal list items on an immediate free-recall
task, a ﬁnding that we replicated in Experiment 1
(see Figure 1). However, even if one accepts that
there are separate primary and secondary memory
systems (and we discuss below the extent to
which the current data do or do not support this
view), the assumption that recall of list-ﬁnal items
are drawn from primary memory only holds if
these items are output at the start of an individual’s
recall. Consequently, no strong inferences about
primary memory capacity can be made from serial
position curves that aggregate data across all trials
regardless of output order. The present experiments
therefore went considerably beyond any previous
developmental work in this area by recording this
crucial output order information and then using it
to conditionalize serial position curves on the
basis of different starting positions. In addition,
Experiment 2 sought to prompt recall from a
point near the end of the list in order to systemati-
cally examine age differences in free recall of a
varying number of list-ﬁnal items.
Both experiments provided clear evidence that
children’s ability to remember the later items on a
list improved with age when these items were
output at the start of an individual’s recall sequence.
In Experiment 1, when participants chose to begin
recall with the 7th item on a 9-item list, younger
individuals showed poorer recall of items 8 and 9
than did older children. The age group difference
in recall of the 9th item on the list when partici-
pants started with the 8th item was not signiﬁcant
in Experiment 1. However, in Experiment 2,
reliable age differences in ﬁnal item recall were
observed regardless of whether the probed (red)
ﬁnal sublist contained 2, 3, or 4 items.
Furthermore, in this second experiment older chil-
dren were more likely to begin their free recall with
the ﬁrst item within the red set of items than were
younger children, providing converging evidence of
their greater capacity for recall of these items. Again
we note that the current data do not necessarily lead
one to conclude that free recall must depend on the
combination of distinguishable primary and sec-
ondary memory systems, and we return to this
issue in more detail below. However, the key
point to make here is that if one does hold this
theoretical position, and therefore assumes that an
individual’s ability to recall list-ﬁnal items at the
start of their free-recall output depends on their
primary memory capacity (Tulving & Colotla,
1970; Unsworth & Engle, 2007a), then the
3Given these estimates, one might question why Year 1 individuals did not show perfect recall in the 7–2 condition of the task (cf.
Figure 7). However, Year 1 children’s recall of the ﬁnal list item on these trials, when their recall commenced with the 8th item on the
list, was high, and any erroneous recall of this ﬁnal item might be a reﬂection of the uncertainty about the type of list about to be pre-
sented on any trial. As the three different conditions were interleaved with one another, participants had no knowledge of the type of
trial that was about to be presented. They might therefore have adopted an encoding strategy that maximized their chances of recalling
any of the last four items on the list (rather than just the last two).
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current data inevitably lead to the conclusion that
primary memory capacity does develop with age.
A subsidiary aim of the current work was to
reﬂect on whether the free-recall paradigm provides
a reliable means of deriving estimates of individuals’
primary memory capacity, again assuming for the
moment that such a system does underpin aspects
of free-recall performance. In this respect, we
believe the current experiments make two impor-
tant contributions concerning the application of
the Tulving and Colotla (1970) method to free-
recall data. First, our evidence of a developmental
change in capacity to recall from the end of a
free-recall list implies that one should adopt a
different criterion ITRI value for children of differ-
ent ages if one is adopting this approach to the esti-
mation of primary memory capacity. However,
determining this value—which of course would
itself be assumed to be directly related to primary
memory capacity—is impossible without additional
independent evidence of this capacity for any given
age. This raises serious worries about circularity if
such independent estimates are not available.
Second, the Tulving and Colotla (1970)
approach assumes that participants begin their
free recall with list-ﬁnal items, and this assumption
does not always hold. Whilst on long lists it may
happen frequently (e.g., Ward et al., 2010), it is
also not uncommon for participants to start recall
with the ﬁrst item on the just-presented list
(Unsworth et al., 2011), and the greater this ten-
dency the less meaningful will be any estimates of
primary and secondary memory derived using the
Tulving and Colotla approach. Crucially, in the
ﬁrst experiment reported here, older individuals
were more likely to begin recall at the start of the
list than were younger children (see Figure 3).
Although we examined development over a rela-
tively narrow age range and employed a relatively
fast presentation rate to reduce the use of strategies,
this greater likelihood of older individuals begin-
ning recall at the start of the list could still poten-
tially reﬂect the greater application of some form
of strategy. This could be deeper encoding of
initial list items, more use of rehearsal of initial
list items to maintain them in immediate
memory, or an awareness that beginning recall
with otherwise hard to access items could result
in superior performance. However, the point to
emphasize is that any age-related difference in like-
lihood of starting free recall with the ﬁrst item on
the list, whatever its cause, would undermine the
use of the Tulving and Colotla method in a devel-
opmental study. In turn, this means that methods
of the form employed here, and which restrict ana-
lyses to trials on which recall does begin with list-
ﬁnal item, are needed if one wishes to extract
potential indices of primary memory capacity
from children’s free recall.
It is therefore possible that future studies could
extract estimates of primary memory capacity
from children’s immediate free-recall performance,
provided that the previous two provisos are properly
taken into consideration. The data from the current
experiments would strongly suggest that clear age
differences would be observed in these estimates
of primary memory capacity. However, we also
note that the current data do not count against a
more unitary explanation of performance based on
a developmental increase in other, more general
factors. In particular, Experiment 2 provided
some evidence that the total number of items that
an individual could remember across both red and
blue recall phases remained relatively constant
across presentation conditions; somewhat lower
totals were observed in the 7–2 condition, but
total recall was comparable across the 6–3 and 5–
4 conditions. One might argue that this simply
reﬂects the capacity of primary memory, and that
participants are holding different subsets of items
(not always just the last few items) in primary
memory on any given trial by choosing to selectively
rehearse these items. However, a potentially
different explanation of these data is that output
interference is a major constraint on free-recall per-
formance. There is considerable evidence that the
effect of verbally outputting responses leads to for-
getting of still-to-be-recalled items in both serial
recall (see Tan & Ward, 2007) and free recall
(Dalezman, 1976; Farrell, 2012; Roediger, 1974).
In particular, Dalezman’s (1976) study, on which
the current Experiment 2 was loosely based, post-
cued adult participants to begin their free recall of
a 15-item list with the ﬁrst, middle, or last ﬁve
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items on the list. Dalezman found that while serial
position curves were markedly affected by this
manipulation, as would be expected and consistent
with the current data, the overall number of items
recalled across trials remained reasonably stable
(see also Bruce & Papay, 1970; Katz, 1968;
Unsworth et al., 2011). The clear implication of
these data is that individuals’ ability to recall a
certain number of items from a free-recall task is
not necessarily moderated by the location of those
items on the input list. In turn, this calls into ques-
tion the suggestion that recall of list-ﬁnal items
depends on a separate memory system (i.e.,
primary memory) from that required for recall of
earlier list items.
Having said this, Dalezman (1976) noted that
the concepts of a limited-capacity store and of
output interference are not mutually exclusive and
argued that both are likely to constrain free-recall
performance. A somewhat similar position was
taken by Farrell (2012) in a recent computational
model of both serial- and free-recall performance.
Farrell rejected the need for a qualitative distinction
between primary and secondary memory and
instead suggested that an individual’s episodic
memory is temporally grouped into successive epi-
sodic clusters. Successful recall involves using con-
textual cues to access a given cluster; items in that
cluster tend to then be recalled in forwards serial
order. Output interference is also a key feature of
the model. Under this analysis, recently presented
(or indeed currently rehearsed) items are not held
in an entirely distinct store. Instead, because the
current cluster is associated with the current
context at the point of recall, it does not need to
be “accessed” before recall can be initiated. As a
result, on long free-recall lists participants show a
tendency to begin recall with list-ﬁnal items and,
provided the ﬁrst item recalled is not the last item
on the list, to then recall the remaining list items
in forwards serial order. Although at heart a
“unitary” account of free recall, this model does
generate something akin to an output buffer that
contains the currently open cluster of items. One
might therefore draw a parallel between the size
of this cluster and the capacity of primary
memory under a dual-system model, and the
currently accessible cluster would be assumed to
be within any “region of direct attentional access”
(Oberauer, 2002). Crucially, the size of this
cluster can vary across participants, as can the
degree of output interference experienced.
Farrell’s model has yet to be applied to develop-
mental data, but in the context of the current exper-
iments, the developmental differences observed
here could be readily explained in terms of either
age-related increases in cluster size (cf. Cowan
et al., 2005; Cowan, Nugent, Elliot, & Saults,
2000) or decreases in susceptibility to output inter-
ference; both would lead to a greater total number
of items being recalled from a trial among older
than from a trial among younger children. The
current results also clearly imply that age-related
changes in the tendency to recall items from a
cluster in forwards serial order is not likely to be
the cause of developmental improvements in recall.
In summary, the present experiments have
clearly demonstrated age-related changes in chil-
dren’s immediate free-recall performance.
Crucially, these changes are not always limited to
individuals’ ability to remember the initial items
on the just-presented list, contrary to what has
been suggested previously (Cole et al., 1971; De
Alwis et al., 2009; Thurm & Glanzer, 1971).
Rather, there is clear evidence that older children
recall a greater total number of items than
younger individuals from across the presented list,
but without any noticeable increase in the tendency
to recall in forwards serial order. In addition, older
children are more likely to begin recall with initial
list items than are younger children. This means
that the greater recall capacity of older children is
evident on these earlier list items, but is not appar-
ent on later list items that are within the recall
capacity of younger individuals, producing the pre-
viously reported age differences in the free-recall
serial position curve when performance is aggre-
gated across all trials. However, when all individ-
uals begin their recall with list-ﬁnal items, older
children do recall more of these items than do
younger children. Consequently, any model that
distinguishes between primary and secondary
memory to explain free-recall performance would
be forced to conclude that primary memory does
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develop with age, contrary to previous claims in the
free-recall literature. However, for the theoretical
reasons outlined above, one is not obliged to
assume that the ability to begin recall with list-
ﬁnal items depends on an entirely distinct
primary memory system as opposed to more
general factors such as output interference.
Consequently further work is needed to link this
aspect of children’s free-recall performance to
both speciﬁc measures of capacity and to more
general measures such as children’s ability to resist
interference.
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